On Zhou's role in the Hong Kong disturbance, see Yu Changgen and Ma Jisen, Zhou Enlai yu Xianggang “Liuqi Baodong” Neimu, pp. Quotation from Barbara Barnouin and Yu Changgen, Zhou Enlai: A Political Life (Hong Kong, 2006), p. On the Cultural Revolution within the Foreign Ministry, see Barbara Barnouin and Yu Changgen, Chinese Foreign Policy during the Cultural Revolution (London, 1998). Barston, Modern Diplomacy (Harlow, 2006), p. Unlike “covert diplomacy,” which conducts exchanges in secrecy, “quiet diplomacy” can be defined as practice that involves “developing contacts, ideas and taking formal initiatives in the public domain but without directly seeking high levels of public press attention.” R.P. 453–477 Yang shengqing et al., Zhongguo gongchandang tanpan shi, Part 2, (Beijing, 2005), pp. Robinson and David Shambaugh, eds., Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (Oxford, 1995), pp. Kreisberg, “China's Negotiating Behaviour,” in Thomas W. Hoare, Embassies in the East: The Story of the British Embassies in Japan, China and Korea from 1859 to the Present (Richmond, Surrey, 1999), pp. Pei Jianzhang et al., Xin Zhongguo waijiao jengyun, Volume 3, (Beijing, 1994), p. 79–86 Wang Taiping et al., Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo waijiaoshi, 1957–1969 (Beijing, 1998), pp.
101 Zhou, Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan, pp.
Mao Zedong, Mao Zedong on Diplomacy, English version (Beijing, 1998), p. See Anne-Marie Brady, Making the Foreign Serve China: Managing Foreigners in the People's Republic (Lanham, MD, 2003).ħ. Philippe Ardant, “Chinese Diplomatic Practice during the Cultural Revolution,” in Jerome Alan Cohen, ed., China's Practice of International Law: Some Case Studies (Cambridge, MA, 1972), pp. Berridge, Diplomacy: Theory and Practice, third edition (Basingstoke, 2005), pp. On the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, see G. 48–57 Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino–American Confrontation (New York, 1994), pp. Zhou Enlai, Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan (Beijing, 1990), pp. On other cases, see Raymond Cohen, Negotiating across Cultures: International Communication in an Independent World, revised edition (Washington, DC, 2007).ģ. But for the sake of convenience, and as is common in the British archives, the terms “British Office,” “British Embassy” and “British Mission” are used interchangeably in this essay.Ģ. The Office of the British Chargé d'Affaires was the formal title of the British representation in China recognised by Beijing, for the two countries did not exchange ambassadors until 1972. The lesson of Britain's quiet diplomacy was a culture-sensitive approach to negotiation and the ability to separate the hostage question from the wider political and economic relationship that would facilitate the resolution of future hostage crises.ġ. Through a step-by-step negotiating approach recommended by the Sinologists in the British Mission, London was finally successful in securing the release of its detained nationals. But in China, the British found a culturally different negotiating partner that was obsessed with principles rather than details. It focused on negotiations through minimal publicity and reciprocal gestures.
In response to China's hostage-taking, the British government preferred quiet diplomacy to extreme retaliation such as a rupture of diplomatic relations and economic sanctions. Two dozen British diplomats and private citizens on the mainland became de facto hostages of their host government. During the radical phase of the Cultural Revolution in 1967–1969, China's violation of the diplomatic norms of the international community reached an unprecedented level.
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